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Cert to Sup. Ct. Del. (Herrmann, 
Duffy, McNeilly) 
State/Criminal Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Challenge is brought against the "four corners" 
rule, whereby the sufficiency of an affidavit supporting a search 
warrant is judged at a suppression hearing merely on the basis of 
the ·evidence before the magistrate who issued the warrant. Evidence 
tending to impeach the credibility of the supporting affidavit 
is considered immaterial if not presented to the original magis-
trate. 
2. FACTS: Petr was convicted of rape, kidnapping, and 
burglary. His defense to the charges at trial was consent of the 
,I 
victim. Evidence was introduced at trial consisting of clothes 
and a knife of the def. These were found by police officers con-
ducting a search of def.'s home relying upon a search warrant. 
An affidavit was relied upon for the warrant. At the suppression 
hearing, petr proffered testimony to prove that the conversations ....., 
with petr to which the affiant testified had never occurred. The 
trial court refused petr's proffer, relying on the "four corners" 
rule. The Sup. Ct. of Del. affirmed. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Because the warrant issuance hearing is 
necessarily ex parte, the suppression hearing affords a def. his 
first chance to challenge the validity of the testimony relied 
upon in issuing the warrant. Petr contends that due process and 
the Fourth Amendment require that he be given the chance to make 
his attack on the affidavit. Significant prejudice resulted from 
the introduction of the clothes and knife at trial. Exclusion of 
such evidence is necessary to deter official violations of Fourth 
Amendment rights. Alternative sanctions, such as perjury indict- I 
ments, or civil actions ::· for damages, are ineffective deter- ) 
rents. 
Petr observes that this Court left open the question of 
challenging the validity of supporting evidence when last it 
. addressed the question, in Rugendorf v. U.S., 376 U.S. 528, 531-32 
(1964): "This Court has never passed directly on the extent to 
which a court may permit such examination, when the search warrant 
is valid on its face and when the allegations of the underlying 
affidavit established 'probable cause'; however, assuming, for 
the purpose of this decision, that such attack may be made, we 
are of the opinion that the search warrant here is valid." 
( 
(~ 
The A.G. of Del. responds that petr's evidence would not have 
shown untruthfulness of the affiant. Recognizing that some courts 
have permitted an exception to the "four corners" doctrine where 
evidence of misstatement of an affiant is so severe as to constitute 
an imposition on the magistrate, the A.G. argues that there was 
no such prel~rninary showing here. Since the def. admitted his 
presence in the victim's horne and that he had sexual relations -- ----with her, and since the knife and clothing served only to identify - -petr with the scene of the crime, the A.G. maintains that if any 
error occurred it was harmless. Finally, the A.G. points out six 
cases, four of them within the last seven yrs., where the Court 
was presented with the question raised in this petition yet 
denied cert. (See resp. at 6) . . 
4. DISCUSSION: 
For purposes of this appeal, as was the case before the 
Del. Sup. Ct., the proffer of evidence must be accepted as made, 
so the A.G.'s argument that petr could not really have proved a 
misstatement is irrelevant. Likewise of no merit is the A.G.'s 
contention of harmless error. It is true that petr admitted his 
presence in the house, but the introduction of the knife was 
certainly probative against the one point of defense advanced by 
petr: that the victim consented. The worthiness of this petn. 
must, therefore, be decided on whether or not it is considered 
necessary to declare a federal constitutional standard for validity 
of affidavits to parallel the federal constitutional standard for 
sufficiency of affidavits. 
The Del. Sup. Ct. applied a strict "four corners" doctrine. 
Its decision did not · recognize the possible exception for the case 




~c.: - r,..,..., lA/ I r -
the proffered evidence here would have met that standard. Rather, 
the Del. Court recognized that the Sup. Ct. had left the question 
of challenging validity open in Rugendorf. Its choice was with 
the majority of states which have adopted a strict r:ule against 
permitting a challenge to supportive evidence. This is because a 
suppression hearing is not a guilt determination. Its purpose 
is only to determine whether the magistrate had probable cause to 
issue the warrant. And probable cause from a constitutional 
standpoint can be supplied by false evidence relied upon in 
I 
good faith. To the extent the def.'s evidence bears upon guilt 
or innocence, it may be introduced attrial, so no harm to def. 
results. 
In King v. u.s., 282 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1960), relied on by 
petr, the court recognized that the law in federal courts was 
different from the law in state courts ,on this question. In 
King, the court struck down a warrant that had relied upon an 
·affidavit signed with a fictitious name. An accurate name was 
required "to enable an aggrieved person to prove and challenge 
I 
the legality of the warrant." The Fourth Circuit relied on Fed. 
R. Crim. Pro. 4l(e) (now, 4l(f)) rather than any constitutional 
provision in arriving at its conclusion. 
Some federal courts follow ay~trict four corneri theory. 
See, ~, U.S. v. Hatcher, 473 F.2d 321, 323 (6th Cir. 1973) (dictum); 
Wangrow v. U.S., 399 F.2d 106, 114 (8th Cir. 1968), ~denied, 
393 u.s. 933. The Ninth Circuit catalogues the varying standards 
in the federal system in U.S. v. Damitz, 495 F.2d 50, 53 (9th 
Cir. 1974): 
l / 
Some circuits have held that if the allegations 
in an affidavit contain a prima facie showing of 
probable cause, the defendant may not challenge 
the underlying validity of the affidavit. More 
recent decisions, however, have permitted such a 
challenge. The Supreme Court has extensively 
examined the sufficiency of the allega tions 
contained in affidavits to show probable cause, 
but it has not squarely decided whether a defen-
dant may go behind the face of an affidavit t b 
challenge the veracity of the allegations. 
See the cases cited in footnotes at 495 F.2d at 55. The solution 
reached by the Ninth Circuit in Damitz was to allow in evidence 
challenging veracity, and then to determine the validity of the 
warrant on the basis of the remaining unrefuted parts of the 
supporting evidence. Also, good faith reliance on the statement 
of a non-government affiant was permitted. Other federal courts 
have permitted challenges only if they allege the magistrate was 
imposed upon. See U.S. v. Dunnings, 425 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1969), 
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1002, and cases cited at p. 4 of resp. brief. 
The present petn must be judged on the ground employed by 
the Del. Sup. Ct., which was a strict four corners approach. 
It is uncontested that that is the majority rule among the 
states, and as just described, several federal circuits apply 
substantially the same rule. Petr cannot raise the conflict 
among the circuits as reason to grant his petn from a state 
court, and the conflict among the differing state standards is 
insufficient grounds for cert. Most importantly, the narrowest 
rule (which was the rule applied here) keeps out no evidence 
relevant to guilt or innocence. It judges probable cause on 
the basis of the facts as presented in good faith to a magistrate. 
Petr does not allege that those facts, as alleged, were insuf-
ficient to sustain the warrant under the "sufficienty of warrant" 




asserting the need for an exc~us~onaLx ·~~~ -- _____ _ 
--~--~--------~ 
affidavits supporting search warrants. 
Whatever additional deterrence an exclusionary rule would \~ offer against perjurious affidavits is highly doubtful. Parti-
cularly is this so where the affiants were not criminal 
gators but third part~s (in this case, the Director of 
-----------------Center) for whom any deterrent value of an exclusionary 
would be entirely lost. The very fact that this Court has under-
taken to declare the requirements of sufficienty with some care 
indicates that the question of probable cause for a warrant is 
to be determined as of the time the magistrate makes his decision. 
The various states should be allowed to continue with their own 
rules on this subject. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: Deny cert. 
There is a response. 
8/30/77 
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BENCH MEMO 
To: Mr. Justice Powell February l S', 1978 
From: Jim Alt 
No. 76-517.6, Franks v. Delaware. 
The question in this case is whether petitioner was (or 
might have been) entitled to present evidence at a suppression 
hearing to prove that police affidavits supporting a search 
warrant contained false statements of fact. The courts below, 
following the "four-corners rule," held that petitioner would 
not be entitled to challenge the truth of the allegations in the 
affidavits under any circumstances. 
I o FACTS. 
Cynthia Bailey reported to police that she had been raped 
7 
in her home by a man of a particular physical description who 
wore clothes of a particular description and carried a knife. 
Police obtained a warrant to search petitioner's home for 
evidence linking him with the crime. 
The affidavit in support of the warrant, sworn to by 
Detectives Brooks and Gray, alleged in substance (App. 6-8): 
(1) that when petitioner was arraigned on an unrelated sexual 
misconduct charge, he blurted out that he thought he was under 
arrest for raping Cynthia Bailey (1[1[1-8); (2) that petitioner 
lived within sight of Cynthia Bailey's home (1[13); (3) that the 
physical description given by Bailey matched petitioner's (1[14); 
(4) that in a "personal conversation" with the affiant, two -
employees of the Delaware Youth Center, where petitioner was 
--------~------------------------· employed, said tha; pe,£itioner cust~marily wore clothing ma~hing 
that described by Bailey (1[1[15-17); and (5) that petitioner 
previously had been convicted for assault with intent to rape (1[18). 
The search of petitioner's home produced the clothing described 
and a knife, all of which were introduced at trial. Because 
petitioner's defense was consent, it appears that ~nly the knifi) 
was relevant to his guilt or innocence. Petitioner contends, though, - ~--~-------------------that his trial strategy might have differed if all this evidence 
had been suppressed. Brief for Petitioner 15. 
As I read petitioner's oral offer of proof at the suppression 
hearing, he sought to prove that the detectives who swore to the 
affidavit supporting the warrant never spoke to the two employees 
at the Delaware Youth Center about petitioner's customary mode of 
dress. 
II. DECISION BELOW. 
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's 
refusal to allow inquiry beyond the face of the warrant and 
supporting affidavit: 
"The majority of the jurisdictions considering this question 
have decided that no attack upon the veracity of an 
underlyin~ affidavit may be made •••• We agree with the 
majori~ rul~ for two reasons. First, it is the function 
of the issuing magistrate to determine the reliability 
of information and credibility of affiants in deciding 
whether the requirement of probable cause has been met. 
There has been no need demonstrated for interfering with 
this function. Second, neither the probable cause nor 
suppression hearings are adjudications of guilt or 
innocence; the matters asserted by defendant are more 
f properly considered in a trial on the merits." App. 40. 
III. ARGUMENTS. 
A. Petitioner. Petitioner contends that inquiry into the 
veracity of affidavits supporting a search warrant must be allowed 
in order to determine whether probable cause in fact existed. 
Because warrants issue ex parte and usually in great haste, the 
issuing magistrate cannot be expected to evaluate or determine 
with much accuracy the veracity of such affidavits. But at some 
point, such a determination should be available. 
Appeals courts routinely review magistrates' determinations 
of whether affidavits on their face support probable cause; thus, 
it would not be unseemly for appeals courts to review magistrates' 
determinations as to veracity. 
Petitioner also contends that defendants should not be required 
to make some preliminary showing before a hearing into the veracity 
I 
I 
of affidavits supporting a warrant may be held. This is so 
because "in most cases a defendant has neither specific evidence 
nor the means to get specific evidence of false allegations, since 
most jurisdictions do not permit discovery depositions in 
criminal cases." Brief for Petitioner 13. 
Petitioner contends that suppression of evidence seized 
pursuant to warrants based on false affidavits is necessary because 
other remedies, such as civil damages suits and perjury prosecutions, 
are sought too rarely to provide realistic deterrence of police 
misconduct • . His bottom line on suppression is "that every 
material misstatement made either intentionally or negligently 
by an affiant should require exclusion of the evidence obtained 
as a result of such misstatement." Brief for Petitioner 16. But 
he would not require suppression on the basis of "innocent 
misrepresentations." Id., at 15. 
B. The State. The State contends that suppression of evidence 
seized under warrants supported by false affidavits would serve 
only "to weed out what must be a minimal number of perjurious 
government agents." Brief for Respondent 6. As to these instances, 
other remedies such as "contempt of court, or official misconduct 
prosecutions and/or civil rights actions against the State" are 
available. The exclusionary rule therefore. should not be extended 
to cover these cases. 
Even if suppression might be required in some cases, the 
State would argue that a defendant must make "a substantial 
showing of misstatement" before a hearing into the veracity of 
affidavits supporting a warrant must be held. The State contends 
that petitioner's offer of proof did not amount to such a showing. 
The State's only other sensible argument is that suppression 
should not be required where the misstatement is not "material" 
in the sense that probable cause would be lacking without it. 
And, it ar&ues, in this case probable cause was present even 
disregarding the challenged portions of the affidavit. 
C. United States as Amicus. The SG makes a persuasive (to 
me) argument that the Fourth Amendment demands some protection 
against police falsification of affidavits in support of search 
warrants. I will not rehearse this argument at length here. The 
SG's argument would result in the law being structured as follows: 
1. When police intentionally have falsified Q\\ ~ffi4Q.Vlt. , 
~ , "the exclusionary rule should be applied whenever the falsified 
~~~~nformation is likely to have influenced the magistrate's decision 
~ to issue the warrant, whether or not it was essential to the 
establishment of probable cause." Brief for U.S. 9; see id., at 26. 
2. When police make misstatements in all innocence, 
suppression- is not regui~ed even if the misstatements are material. 
Id., at 9, 27. -
3. "[A]n unintentional material misrepresentation [should] 
void[ ] the warrant if made recklessly, but not if m~ merely 
negligently." Id., at 28o By "material misrepresentation," the 
SG apparently means that it "was essential to the establishment of 
probable cause." 
4. Before a defendant is entitled to a hearing on the veracity 
l 
f 
of affidavits supporting a warrant, he must (a) indicate with 
specificity the portions of the affidavit alleged to be false; 
(b) characterize the government's responsibility for the falsity 
as either intentional or reckless; and (c) substantiate his 
assertions with affidavits or other sworn stat·ements from his 
intended witnesses. "In cases where satisfaction of the affidavit 
requirement would be impractical (~, where the defendant intends 
to call a hostile witness, such as a police officer), the defendant 
should inform the court of these difficulties and should submit an 
affidavit setting forth the testimony that he expects to present 
at an evidentiary hearing to establish the falsity of the 
representations made to procure the search warrant." Id., at 32.-133. 
I 
Under the SG's proposed rules, he would remand the case for 
further consideration. Although he agrees with the State that 
the alleged misrepresentations may not have been "material" in 
the sense that they were "essential to the establishment of 
probable cause," under the SG's rules suppression nonetheless would 
be required if the misrepresentations were made intentionahly. -Petitioner's oral offer of proof can fairly be read as alleging 
that the misstatements were made intentionally. Although petitioner 
did not support his allegation with affidavits, the SG apparently 
the way open for him to do so on remand. 
Amicus. The ACLU urges the Court to limit 
~~~~----~----
to the case of intentional misrepresentations 
to probable cause. This, it urges, is such a 
If the Court should go beyond this limited case, however, 
'-
the ACLU would support suppressing warrants based on affidavits 
containing neglige~, as well as intentional and reckless, 
misstatements of fact. 
IV. DISCUSSION. 
I find the SG's position attractive in the main. I agree 
withi him that there are some cases - most notably, those 
involving intentional misstatements of fact - where defendants 
should be able to go behind the face of a a warrant. My only 
problem with his proposed solution is that it is a little 
elaborate. 
/'1\ One way to simplify the SG's construction would be to ~ 
~hat intentional or reckless mistatements will void a warrant, 
supported 
but only if the ~ant would not be l b~ probable cause without 
~ 's"' 
the misstatement • Negligent ai~atements would not void 
a warrant in any circumstanceso The problem with this formulation 
would be that it would not penalize intentional misstatements 
~ where the warrant would be supported without them, whereas 
the SG's formulation wouldo It is a judgment call as to whether 
the increased complexity of the SG's formulation is justified 
by its increased deterrence of intentional misstatements. My 
own preference would be to adopt the SG's formulation because 
* 9~ of its increas~d _dete~ence, but reasonable people could differ. 
--~ - 1~~~1 • ! 
~·1&11f 
If the simplfied version were adopted, it would have to ~~ 
be decided whether the allegedly false statements in the affidavits 
here were "material" in the sense that the warrant would be 
supported by probable cause without them. My own feeling is that 
they were not "material" in this sense. But since no lower 
court has passed on this issue, this Court might just announce 
the rule and remand for determination of the materiality issue. 
Under the SGvs formulation, where materiality does not matter 
if the misstatements were intentional, a remand certainly would 
be required. 
JA 
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Re: No. 77-5176 ~ Franks v. Delaware 
Dear Han:y; 
Please join ne. 
Sincerely, 
T.M. 
Mr. Justice Blackrmm 
cc; The Conference 
~u:prtntt <!Jourl of tJrt ~b ~brlts 
2lfz;ur!p:ngton. ~. <!J. ZOe?~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE w ... .J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
RE: No. 77-5176 
Dear Harry: 
I agree. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
June 7, 1978 
Franks v. Delaware 
Sincerely, 
-~u:punu <!fonri of tqt ~nitt~ j;tatts 
'Jlltllfrittgbm. ~. <!f. 2llc?,.~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN June 7, 1978 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Re: No. 77-5176 - Franks v. Delaware 
I propose a few changes on pages 2, 21 and 32 of the 
typed draft circulated this morning. New pages are enclosed 





may so challenge the veracity of a sworn statement used by police 
to procure a search warrant. We reverse, and we hold that, where 
the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false 
statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard 
for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, 
the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the de-
fendant' s request. In the event that at that hearing the allegation 
of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a 
preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit's false material 
set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to 
establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the 
fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause 
was lacking on the face of the affidavit. 
No. 77-5176 
- 21 -
In saying this, however, one must give cognizance to com-
peting values that lead us to impose limitations. They perhaps can 
best be addressed by noting the arguments of respondent and others 
against allowing veracity challenges. The arguments are several: 
First, respondent argues that the exclusionary rule, created 
in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), is not a personal con-
stitutional right, but only a judicially-created remedy extended where 
its benefit as a deterrent promises to outweigh the societal cost of its 
use; that the Court has declined to apply the exclusionary rule when 
illegally seized evidence is used to impeach the credibility of a de-
fendant 1 s testimony, Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), is 
used in a grand jury proceeding, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 
338 (1914), or is used in a civil trial, United States v. Janis, 4.28 U.S. 







of Members of this Court as to the wisdom of extending the exclu-
sionary rule to collateral areas, such as civil or grand jury pro-
ceedings, the Court has not questioned, in the absence of a more 
efficacious sanction, the continued application of the rule to suppress 
evidence from the State's case where a Fourth Amendment violation 
has been substantial and deliberate. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 
U.S. 387, 422 (1977) (dissenting opinion); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 
465, 538 (1976) (dissenting opinion). We see no principled basis for 
distinguishing between the question of the sufficiency of an affidavit, 
which also is subject to a post-search reexamination, and the ques-
tion of its good faith. 
To: The mh "'f~ust i e Mr. J i B nan 
Mr. usti e art 
Mr. u lc ite 
Mr. Justice M~rshall 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justi ce Rehnquist 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
From: Mr. Just i ce Blackmun 
JUN 7 19 /~ 
No. 77-5176 - Franks v. Delaware · 
Circulated: ______________ _ 
Recirculated: ____________ __ 
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinio 
Court. 
This case presents an important and longstanding 
Fourth Amendment law. Does a defendant in a criminal proceeding 
ever have the right, under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendm.ents, 
subsequent to the ex parte issuance of a search warrant, to challenge 
the truthfulness of factual statements made in an affidavit supporting 
the warrant? 
In the present case the Supreme Court of Delaware held, as 
a matter of first impression for it, that a defendant under no circumstance 
f 
f 
No. 77-! 6 
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may so challenge the veracity of a sworn statement used by police 
to procure a search warrant. We reverse, and .we hold that, where 
the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false 
statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard 
for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, 
the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the de-
fendant' s request. In the event that at that hearing the allegation 
lor reckless disregar~ 
of perjury)is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the 
evidence, and, with the affidavit's false material set to one side, 
the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable 
cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search 
excluded from the prosecution's case-in-chief. 
•'· 
No 77-. 6 
- 3 -
I 
The controversy over the veracity of the search warrant 
affidavit in this case arose in connection with petitioner Jerome 
Franks' state conviction for rape, kidnaping, and burglary. On 
Friday. March 5, 1976, Mrs. Cynthia Bailey told police in Dover, 
Delaware, that she had been confronted in her home earlier that 
morning by a man with a knife, and that he had sexually assaulted 
her. She described her assailant's age, race, height, build, and 
facial hair, and gave a detailed description of his clothing as con-
sisting of a white thermal undershirt, black pants with a silver or 
gold buckle, a brown leather three-quarter length coat, and a dark 
knit cap that he wore pulled down around his eyes. 
That same day, petitioner Franks coincidentally was taken 
into custody for an assault involving a 15-year-old girl, Brenda 
I 
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Bradley, six days earlier. After his formal arrest, and while awaiting 
a bail hearing in Family Court, petitioner allegedly stated to Robert 
. -
McClements, the youth officer accompanying him, that he was sur-
prised the bail hearing was "about Brenda Bradley. I know her. I 
thought you said Bailey. I don't know her." Trial Tr. 175, 186. At 
the time of this statement, the police allegedly had not yet recited to 
petitioner his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
On the following Monday, March 8, officer McClements 
happened to mention the courthouse incident to a detective, Ronald R. 
Brooks, who was working on the Bailey case. Trial Tr. 186, 190-
191. On March 9, detective Brooks and detective Larry D. Gray 
submitted a sworn affidavit to a justice of the peace in Dover, in 
!:_/ 
support of a warrant to search petitioner's apartment. In para-
graph 8 of the affidavit's "probable cause page" mention was made 
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of petitioner 1s statement to McClements. In paragraph 10, it was 
noted that the description of the assailant given to the police by Mrs. 
Bailey included the above-mentioned clothing. Finally, the affidavit 
also described the attempt made by police to confirm that petitioner•s 
typical outfit matched that of the assailant. Paragraph 15 recited: 
••on Tuesday, 3/9/76, your affiant contacted Mr. James Williams 
and Mr. Wesley Lucas of the Delaware Youth Center where Jerome 
Franks is employed and did have personal conversation with both 
these people. 11 Paragraphs 16 and 17 respectively stated: 11 Mr. James 
Williams revealed to your affiant that the normal dress of Jerome 
Franks does consist of a white knit thermal undershirt and a brown 
leather jacket, 11 and 11Mr. Wesley Lucas revealed to your affiant 
that in addition to the thermal undershirt and jacket, ' Jerome Franks 
often wears a dark green knit hat. 11 
No. 77-51 
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The warrant was issued on the basis of this affidavit. App. 9. 
Pursuant to the warrant, police searched petitioner• s apartment and found 
a white thermal undershirt, a knit hat, dark pants, and a leather jacket, 
and, on petitioner•s kitchen table, a single-blade knife. All these 
ultimately were introduced in evidence at trial. 
Prior to the trial, however, petitioner•s counsel filed a 
written motion to suppress the clothing and the knife found in the search; 
this motion alleged that the warrant on its face did not show probable 
cause and that the search and seizure were in violation of the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. ~·, at 11-12. At the hearing on the motion .to 
suppress, defense counsel orally amended the challenge to include an attack 
on the veracity of the warrant affidavit; he also specifically requested 
the right to call as witnesses detective Brooks, Wesley Lucas of the 
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3_1 
Youth Center, and James Morrison, formerly of the Youth Center. 
Id., at 14-17. Counsel asserted that -Lucas and Morrison would testify 
that neither had been personally interviewed by the warrant affiants, 
and that, although they might have talked to another police officer, 
any information given by them to that officer was "somewhat different" 
from what was recited in the affidavit. Id., at 16. Defense counsel 
charged that the misstatements were included in the affidavit not 
inadvertently, but in "bad faith." Id., at 25. Counsel also sought 
permission to call officer McClements and petitioner as witnesses, 
to seek to establish that petitioner 1s courthouse statement to police 
had been obtained in violation of petitioner 1 s Miranda rights, and 
that the search warrant was thereby tainted as the fruit of an illegally 
obtained confession. Id. , at 17, 27. 
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In rebuttal, the State's attorney argued in detail, App. 15-
24, (a) that Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, ._ § § 2306 a:nd 2307 (1974), con-
templated that any challenge to a search warrant was to be limited 
to questions of sufficiency based on the face of the affidavit; (b) that, 
purportedly, a majority of the States whose practice was not dictated 
'}_/ 
by statute observed such a rule; and (c) that federal cases on the 
issue were to be distinguished because of Fed. Rule Grim. Proc. 
4/ 
4l(e). He also noted that 
this Court had reserved the general issue of subfacial challenge to 
veracity in United States v. Rugendorf, 376 U.S. 528, 531-532 (1964), when 
it disposed of that case on the ground that, even if a veracity challenge 
were permitted, the alleged factual inaccuracies in that case's affidavit 
"were of only peripheral relevancy to the showing of probable cause, 
No. 77-5~ 
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and, not being within the personal knowledge of the affiant, did not 
go to the integrity of the affidavit. 11 Id., at 532. The State objected to 
petitioner's 11going behind [the warrant affidavit] in any way, 11 and 
argued that the court must decide petitioner's motion 11 on the four 
corners 11 of the affidavit. App. 21. 
The trial court sustained the State's objection to petitioner• s 
proposed evidence. Id., at 25, 27. The motion to suppress was denied, 
and the clothing and knife were admitted as evidence at the ensuing trial. 
Trial Tr. 192-196. Petitioner was convicted. In a written Motion for 
Judgment of Acquittal and/or New Trial, Record Document No. 23, 
petitioner repeated his objection to the admission of the evidence, 
stating that he 11should have been allowed to impeach the Affidavit used 
in the Search Warrant to show purposeful misrepresentation of informa-
tion contained therein. 11 Id., at 2. The motion was denied, and 
petitioner was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 25 years 
each and an additional consecutive life sentence. 
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed. 373 
A. 2d 578 (1977). It agreed with what it deemed to be the ••majority 
rule 11 that no attack upon the veracity of a warrant affidavit could be 
made: 
11We agree with the majority rule for two reasons. 
First, it is the function of the is suing magistrate to 
determine the reliability of information and credibility 
of affiants in deciding whether the requirement of 
probable cause has been met. There has been no need 
demonstrated for interfering with this function. Second, 
neither the probable cause nor suppression hearings 
are adjudications of guilt or innocence; the matters 
asserted by defendant are more properly considered 
in a trial on the merits. II Id., at sao. 
Because of this resolution, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that 
there was no need to consider petitioner's 11other contentions, 
relating to the evidence that would have been introduced for impeach-
ment purposes. 11 Ibid. 
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Franks' petition for certiorari presented only the issue 
whether the trial court had erred in refusing to consider his alle-
EJ 
gation of misrepresentation in the warrant affidavit. Because 
of the importance of the question, and because of the conflict among 
both state and federal courts, we granted certiorari. 434 U.S. 
( 1977). 
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II 
It may be well first to note how we are. compelled to reach 
the Fourth Amendment is sue proffered in this case. In particular, 
the State 1 s proposals of an independent and adequate state ground 
and of harmless error do not dispose of the controversy. 
Respondent argues that petitioner's trial counsel, who is 
not the attorney representing him in this Court, failed to include the 
challenge to the veracity of the warrant affidavit in the written motion 
to suppress filed before trial, contrary to the requirement of Del. 
Super. Ct. Rule Crim. Proc. 4l(e) (1974) that a motion to suppress 
"shall state the grounds upon which it is made. 11 The Supreme Court 
of Delaware, however, disposed of petitioner's Fourth Amend-
ment claim on the merits. A ruling on the merits of a federal question 
by the highest state court leaves the federal question open to review 
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in this Court. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 234 U.S. 123, 
134 (1914); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 436-437 (1959); Boykin 
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 241-242 (1969). 
Respondent next suggests that any error here was hartnless. 
Assuming arguendo, respondent says, that petitioner's Fourth Amend-
ment claim was valid, and that the warrant should have been tested 
for veracity and the evidence excluded, it is still clear beyond a reason-
able doubt that the evidence complained of did not contribute to peti-
tioner's conviction. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52-53 
(1970). This contention falls of its own weight. The sole is sue at 
trial was that of consent. Petitioner admitted, App. 37, that he had 
engaged in sexual relations with Mrs. Bailey on the day in question. 
She testified, Trial Tr. 50-51, 69-70, that she had not consented 
to this, and that petitioner, ----------- --3> 
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upon first encountering her in the house, had threatened her with a 
knife to force her to submit. Petitioner claimed that she had given 
full consent and that no knife had been present. Id., at 254, 271. 
To corroborate its contention that consent was lacking, the State 
introduced in evidence a stainless steel wooden-handled kitchen 
knife found by the detectives on the kitchen table in petitioner's 
apartment four days after the alleged rape. Id., at 195-196; Magis-
Record Document No. 22. 
trate' s Return on the Search Warrant March 9, 1976, Defense counsel 
objected to its admission, arguing that Mrs. Bailey had not given any 
detailed description of the knife alleged to be involved in the incident 
and had claimed to have seen the knife only in "pitch blackness." ~·, 
at 195. The State obtained its admission, however, as a knife that 
matched the description contained in the search warrant, and Mrs. 
Bailey testified that the knife allegedly used was, like the knife in 
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evidence. single -edged and not a pocket knife, and that the knife in 
evidence was the same length and thickness as the knife used in the 
crime. Id., at 69, 114-115. The State carefully elicited from 
detective Brooks the fact that this was the only knife found in peti-
tioner's apartment. Id., at 196. Although respondent argues that 
the knife was presented to the jury as 11merely exemplary of the 
generic class of weapon testimonially described by the victim, 11 
Brief for Respondent 15-16, the State at trial clearly meant to suggest 
that this was the knife that had been used against Mrs. Bailey. Had 
the warrant been quashed, and the knife excluded from the trial as 
evidence. we cannot say with any assurance that the jury would have 
reached the same decision on the issue of consent, particularly since 
there was other countervailing evidence on that issue. 
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We should note, in addition, why this case cannot be treated 
as was the situation in Rugendorf v. United States, supra. There 
the Court held that no Fourth Amendment question was presented 
when the claimed misstatements in the search warrant affidavit 
"were of only peripheral relevancy to the showing of probable cause, 
and, not being within the personal knowledge of the affiant, did not go 
to the integrity of the affidavit." 376 U.S., at 532 (emphasis added). 
Rugendorf emphasized that the "erroneous statements •.. were not 
those of the affiant" and thus "fail[ ed] to show that the affiant was in 
bad faith or that he made any misrepresentations to the Commissioner 
~I 
in securing the warrant. 11 Id., at 533. Here, whatever the judgment 
may be as to the relevancy of the alleged misstatements, the integrity 
of the affidavit was directly placed in issue by petitioner in his alle-
gation that the affiants did not, as claimed, speak directly to Lucas 
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and Morrison. Whether such conversations took place is surely a 
matter "within the personal knowledge of the affiant[ s]." We also 
might note that although respondent's brief puts forth that the alleged 
misrepresentations in the affidavit were of little importance in estab-
lishing probable cause, Brief for Respondent 16, respondent at oral 
argument appeared to disclaim any reliance on Rugendorf. Tr. of 
Oral Arg. 30. 
,. '" 
No. 77- 76 
- 18 -
III 
Whether the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the 
derivative exclusionary rule made applicable to the States under 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), ever mandate that a defendant 
be permitted to attack the veracity of a warrant affidavit after the 
warrant has been issued and executed, is a question that encounters conflic 
ing values. The bulwark of Fourth Amendment protection, of course, 
is the Warrant Clause, requiring that, absent certain exceptions, 
police obtain a warrant from a neutral and disinterested magistrate 
before embarking upon a search. In deciding today that, in certain · 
circumstances, a challenge to a warrant's veracity must be permitted; 
we derive our ground from language of the Warrant Clause itself, 
which surely takes the affiant• s good faith as its premise: "[ N] o 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
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affirmation ... " Judge Frankel, in United States v. Halsey, 257 
F. Supp. 1002, 1005 (SDNY 1966), aff1d, Docket No. 31369 (CA 2 
II. 
1967) (unreported), put the matter simply: [W]hen the Fourth Amend-
ment demands a factual showing su:£ficient to comprise 1probable 
cause, 1 the obvious assumption is that there will be a truthful showing" 
(emphasis in original). This does not mean "truthful" in the sense 
that every fact recited in the warrant affidavit is necessarily correct, 
for probable cause may be found~d upon hearsay and upon information 
received from informants, as well as upon information within the 
affiant 1s own knowledge that sometimes must be garnered hastily. 
But surely it is to be "truthful" in the sense that the information put 
forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as true. 
It is established law, see Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 
47 (1933); Gicordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-486 (1958); 
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Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114-115 (1964), that a warrant 
affidavit must set forth particular facts and circumstances underlying the 
existence of probable cause, so as to allow the magistrate to make an 
independent evaluation of the matter. If an informant's tip is the source 
of information, the affidavit must recite "some of the underlying cir-
cumstances from which the informant concluded" that relevant evidence 
might be discovered, and "some of the underlying circumstances from 
which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not 
be disclosed, was 1 credible' or his information 1 reliable. 1 " Id., at 
114. Because it is the magistrate who must determine independently 
whether there is probable cause, Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 
10, 13-14 (1948); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270-271 (1960), 
it would be an unthinkable imposition upon his authority if a warrant 
or recklessly 
affidavit, revealed after the fact to contain a deliberately false statement, 
were to stand beyond impeachment. 
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In saying this, however, one must give cognizance to com-
peting values that lead us to impose limitations. They perhaps can 
best be addressed by noting the arguments of respondent and others 
against allowing veracity challenges. The arguments are several; 
First, respondent notes that the exclusionary rule, created 
in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), is not a personal con-
stitutional right, but only a judicially-created remedy extended where 
its benefit as a deterrent promises to outweigh the societal cost of 
its use. The Court, accordingly, has declined to apply the exclusionary 
rule when illegally seized evidence is used to impeach the credibility 
of a defendant's testimony, Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 
(1954), is used in a grand jury proceeding, United States v. Calandra, 
414 U.S. 338 (1974), or is used in a civil trial, United States v. Janis, 
428 U.S. 433 (1976). The Court similarly has restricted application 
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of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule in federal habeas 
corpus review of a state conviction . . See Stone v. Powell, 428 
U.S. 465 ( 1976 ). Respondent argues that applying the exclusionary 
or reckless 
rule to another situation -- the deterrence of deliberate untruthfulness 
in a warrant affidavit -- is not justified for many of the same reasons 
that led to the above restrictions; interfering with a criminal con-
viction in order to deter official misconduct is a burden too great to 
impose on society. 
Second, respondent argues that a citizen's privacy interests 
are adequately protected by a requirement that applicants for a 
warrant submit a sworn affidavit and by the magistrate's independent 
determination of sufficiency based on the face of the affidavit. Apply-
ing the exclusionary rule to attacks upon veracity would weed out a 
minimal number of perjurious government statements, says respondent, 
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but would overlap unnecessarily with existing penalties against perjury, 
including criminal prosecutions, departmental d·iscipline for mis-
conduct., contempt of court, and civil actions. 
Third, it is argued that the magistrate already is equipped to 
conduct a fairly vigorous inquiry into the accuracy of the factual 
affidavit supporting a warrant application. He may question the affiant, 
or st1nunon other persons to give testimony at the warrant proceeding. 
The incremental gain from a post-search adversary proceeding, it is 
said, would not be great. 
Fourth, it is argued that it would unwisely diminish the 
solemnity and moment of the magistrate 1 s proceeding to make his 
inquiry into probable cause reviewable in regard to veracity. The 
less final., and less deference paid to, the magistrate 1s determination 
of veracity, the less initiative will he use in that task. Denigration 
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of the magistrate 1s function would be imprudent insofar as his scrutiny 
is the last bulwark preventing any particular in.vasion of privacy 
before it happens. 
Fifth, it is argued that permitting a post-search evidentiary 
hearing on issues of veracity would confuse the pressing issue of 
guilt or innocence with the collateral question as to whether there 
had been official misconduct in the drafting of the affidavit. The 
weight of criminal dockets, and the need to prevent diversion of 
attention from the main is sue of guilt or innocence, militate against 
such an added burden on the trial courts. And if such hearings were 
conducted routinely, it is said, they would be ·misused by defendants 
as a convenient source of discovery. Defendants might even use the 
hearings in an attempt to force revelation of the identity of informants. 
No. 77-5176 
- 25 -
Sixth and finally, it is argued that a post- search veracity 
challenge is inappropriate because the accuracy of ·an affidavit in 
large part is beyond the control of the affiant. An affidavit may 
properly be based on hearsay, on fleeting observations, and on tips 
received from unnamed informants whose identity often will be properly 
protected from revelation under McCray v. illinois, 386 U.S. 300 
( 1967). 
None of these considerations is trivial. Indeed, because of 
them, the rule announced today has a limited scope, both in regard 
to when exclusion of the seized evidence is mandated, and when a 
hearing on allegations of misstatements must be accorded. But 
neither do the considerations cited by respondent and others have 
a fully controlling weight; we conclude that they are insufficient to 
justify an absolute ban on post-search impeachment of veracity. 
On this side of the balance, also, there are pressing considerations: 
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First, a flat ban on impeachment of veracity could denude 
' 
the probable cause requirement of all-real meaning. The require-
ment that a warrant not issue "but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, " would be reduced to a nullity if a police 
officer was able to use deliberately falsified allegations to demon-
strate probable cause, and, having misled the magistrate, then was 
able to remain confident that the ploy was worthwhile. It is this 
specter of intentional falsification that, we think, has evoked such 
widespread opposition to the flat nonimpeachment rule from the 
7/ 
commentators, from the American Law Institute in its Model Code 
of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, § SS 290. 3 (1 ), from the federal 
Courts of Appeals, and from some state courts. On occasion, of 
course, an instance of deliberate falsity will be exposed and confirmed 
without a see United States ex rel. Petillo v. 
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New Jersey, 400 F. Supp. 1152, 1171-1172 (N.J. 197 5 ), vacated 
and remanded by order sub ~ Albanese v. Yeager, 541 F. 2d 
275 (CA3 1976), or at a hearing on the sufficiency of the affidavit, 
cf. United States v. Upshaw, 448 F. 2d 1218, 1221-1222 (CAS 1971), 
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 934 ( 1972 ). A flat nonimpeachment rule 
would bar reexamination of the warrant even in these cases. 
Second, the hearing before the magistrate not always will 
lawless or reckless 
suffice to discourage misconduct. The pre-search proceeding is 
necessarily~ parte, since the subject of the search cannot be tipped 
off to the application for a warrant lest he destroy or remove evidence. 
The usual reliance of our legal system on adversary proceedings itself 
should be an indication that an~ parte inquiry is likely to be less 
vigorous. The magistrate has no acquaintance with the information 
that may contradict the good faith and reasonable basis of the affiant's 
allegations. The pre- search proceeding will frequently be marked 
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by haste, because of the understandable desire to act before the 
evidence disappears; this urgency will not always permit the magistrate 
to make an extended independent examination of the affiant or other 
witnesses. 
Third, the alternative sanctions of a perjury prosecution, 
administrative discipline, contempt, or a civil suit are not likely to 
fill the gap. Mapp v. Ohio, supra, implicitly rejected the adequacy 
of these alternatives. Mr. Justice Douglas noted this in his con-
currence in Mapp, 367 U.S., at 670, where he quoted from Wolf v. 
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 42 (1949 ): 11 'Self- scrutiny is a lofty ideal, 
but its exaltation reaches new heights if we expect a District Attorney 
to prosecute himself or his associates for well-meaning violations of 
the search and seizure clause during a raid the District Attorney or 
his associates have ordered. 1 11 
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Fourth, allowing an evidentiary hearing, after a suitable 
preliminary proffer of material falsity, would not diminish the 
importance and solemnity of the warrant-issuing process. It is the 
~parte nature of the initial hearing, rather than the magistrate's 
capacity, that is the reason for the review. A magistrate's deter-
mination is presently subject to review before trial as to sufficiency 
without any undue interference with the dignity of the magistrate's 
function. Our reluctance today to extend the rule of exclusion beyond 
instances of deliberate misstatements, and those of reckless disregard, 
leaves a broad field where the magistrate is the sole protection of a 
citizen's Fourth Amendment rights, namely, in instances where police 
have been merely negligent in checking or recording the facts relevant 
to a probable cause determination. 
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Fifth, the claim that a post- search hearing will confuse the 
issue of the defendant's guilt with the issue of the State's possible 
misbehavior is footless. The hearing will not be in the presence 
of the jury. An issue extraneous to guilt already is examined in 
any probable cause determination or review of probable cause. Nor, 
if a sensible threshold showing is required and sensible substantive 
requirements for suppression are maintained, need there be any 
new large-scale commitment of judicial resources; many claims 
will wash out at an early stage, and the more substantial ones in any 
event would require judicial resources for vindication if the suggested 
alternative sanctions were truly to be effective. The requirement of 
a substantial preliminary showing should suffice to prevent the misuse 
of a veracity hearing for purposes of discovery or obstruction. And 
because we are faced today with only the question of the integrity of 
No. 77-51 
- 31 -
the affiant's representations as to his own activities, we need not de-
cide, and we in no way predetermine, the difficult question whether 
a reviewing court must ever require the revelation of the identity 
of an informant once a substantial preliminary showing of falsity 
has been made. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), the 
Court's earlier disquisition in this area, concluded only that the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not require 
the State to expose an informant's identity routinely, upon a 
defendant's mere demand, when there was ample evidence in the 
probable cause hearing to show that the informant was reliable 
and his information credible. 
Sixth and finally, as to the argument that the exclusionary 
rule should not be extended to a "new" area, we cannot regard any 
such extension Despite the deep skepticism 
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of Members of this Court as to the wisdom of extending the exclu-
sionary rule to collateral areas, such as· civil or g·rand jury pro-
ceedings, the Court has not questioned, in the absence of a more 
efficacious sanction, the continued application of the rule to suppress 
evidence from the State•s criminal case-in-chief where a Fourth 
Amendment violation has been substantial and deliberate. See Brewer 
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 422 (1977) (dissenting opinion); Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976) (~issenting opinion). We see no 
principled basis for distinguishing between the question of the 
sufficiency of an affidavit, which also is subject to a post-search 




In sum, and to repeat with some embellishment what we 
stated at the beginning of this opinion: There is, of course, a pre-
sumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the search 
warrant. To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger's attack 
must be more than conclusory and must be supported by more than 
a mere desire to cross-examine. There must be allegations of 
deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth, and those 
allegations must be accompanied by an offer of proof. They should 
point out specifically the portion of the warrant affidavit that is 
claimed to be false; and they should be accompanied by a statement 
of supporting reasons. Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable 
statements of witnesses should be furnished, or their absence satis-
factorily explained. Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake 
No. 77-5176 _.. 
- 34 -
are insufficient. The falsity or reckless disregard whose impeach-
ment is permitted today is only that of the affiant, not of any non-
governmental informant. Finally, if these requirements are met, 
and if, when material that is the subject of the alleged falsity or 
reckless disregard is set to one side, there remains sufficient content 
in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable cause, no 
§_I 
hearing is required. On the other hand, if the remaining content 
is insufficient, the defendant is entitled, under the Fourth Amend-
ment, to his hearing. Whether he will prevail at that hearing is, of 
course, another is sue. 
Because of Delaware's absolute rule, its courts did not have 
occasion to consider the proffer put forward by petitioner Franks. 
Since the framing of suitable rules to govern proffers is a matter 
' . . 
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properly left to the States, we decline ourselves to pass on petitioner's 
proffer. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Delaware is reversed, 
and the case is r~manded for further proceedings not inconsistent 
with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 




Please join me. 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
.... j'' 
To: Mr. Justice Powell June 8, 1978 
From: Jim Alt 
Re: Justice Blackmun's opLnLon for the Court in No. 77-5176, 
Franks v. Delaware. 
This opinion, although rather lengthy, comes out precisely 
where I would. It holds that where a defendant shows that an 
affiant knowingly or recklessly m~ false statements in an 
affidavit supporting a search warrant, and where the warrant will 
-----------------------not support probable cause without the state~ents, the defendant 
is entitled to suppression of evidence seized pursuant to the --- ------
warrant. The opinion also requires the defendant to make a 
substantial showing before he is entitled to a hearing on the 
~
veracity of statements in the affidavit: 
"To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger's attack 
must be more than conclusory and must be supported by 
more than a mere desire to cross-examine. There must be 
allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless 
disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be 
accompanied by an offer of proof. They should point out 
specifically the portion of the warrant affidavit that is 
claimed to be false; and they should be accompanied by a 
statement of supporting reasons. Affidavits or sworn or 
otherwise reliable statements of witnesses should be 
furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained." 
- ------------------------------
2. 
form · the · .basis for suppression o (You: wrote, "I'm not at rest as to 
effect of 'reckless' action by police. Difference between 
negligence and reckless conduct often is difficult to determi.ne.") 
My own view is that trial judges are able to tell the difference 
between the two, and that in doubtful cases they are likely to 
give the benefit of doubt to the police. I also think that 
police should not be able to insulate their conduct by deliberately 
ignoring whether their statements are true or false, which is 
my conception of "reckless" conduct. There is a parallel to be 
drawn here to the constitutional test for libel of public figures; 
i.e., wilful falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth. Thus, 
I would be inclined to go along with Justice Blackmun's standard. 
The only question I have about the opinion is whether it would 
1 
be kinder not to mention the names of the two rape victims 
involved. You took pains not to do so in Neil v. Biggers, 409 
U.S. 188 (1972), and we consciously have followed this policy 
this Term in Moore v. Illinois, No. 76-5344, and Browder v. 
Director, Dept. of Corrections, No. 76-5325. Given Justice 
Blackmun's acute sensitivity to the feelings and dignity of rape 
victims, see his concurrence in Moore v. Illinois, I would think 
he would be eager to avoid embarrassment of this kind. Although 
the similarity between the names of the two victims played an 
apparent part in the chain of events leading to petr's arrest, 
~ A see Opinion at 3-4, I would think the Justice could re-write this 
i lpart if he truly were concerned about the victims' feelings. 
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JUSTICE POTTER STE WART 
June 8, 1978 
Re: No. 77-5176, Franks v. Delaware 
Dear Harry, 
I am glad to join your opinion for 
the Court. 
Sincerely yours, 
() ~)' \7 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
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CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 8, 1978 
Re: 77-5176 - Franks v. Delaware 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Mr. Justice Blackrnun 
Copies to the Conference 
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.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
~ttpr.tttU Qf01trl qf tlft ~tb ~taf.tg 
jiru;Ipngfut4gl. <If. 211~~;1 
Re: No. 77-5176 - Franks v. Delaware 
Dear Harry: 
June 9, 1978 
As I told you on the telephone yesterday, the Chief 
has asked me to try a dissent in this case. 
Sincerely, 
~nr--
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
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JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE June 12, 1978 
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CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
June 19, 1978 
Re: 77-5176 - Franks v. · Delaware 
Dear Bill: 
I join your dissent. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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